From Bretton Woods to Brussels:  A Legal Analysis of the Exchange-Rate Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund and the European Community by Myrus, Richard
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 7 Article 9 
1994 
From Bretton Woods to Brussels: A Legal Analysis of the 
Exchange-Rate Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Community 
Richard Myrus 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Myrus, From Bretton Woods to Brussels: A Legal Analysis of the Exchange-Rate Arrangements of 
the International Monetary Fund and the European Community, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 2095 (1994). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol62/iss7/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
FROM BRETTON WOODS TO BRUSSELS: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF THE EXCHANGE-RATE
ARRANGEMENTS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
RICHARD MYR US
INTRODUCTION
Exchange rates represent the price at which the currency of one coun-
try can be purchased with the currency of another.t These rates indi-
rectly affect the costs of the goods, capital, and services that flow across
national borders.2 According to Joseph Gold, former General Counsel
of the International Monetary Fund, "[fqor most countries, there is no
single price which has such an important influence on both the financial
world-in terms of asset values and rates of return, and on the real
world-in terms of production, trade and employment. 3
Orderly exchange-rate management is crucial for nations seeking to
maintain stable price levels and sustained economic growth.4 Exchange
rate volatility has a chilling effect on both free trade and international
investment because when exchange rates fluctuate significantly, profits
become uncertain and businesses must hedge exchange-rate risks. This
uncertainty diminishes the willingness of enterprises to trade with their
counterparts in other countries, ultimately resulting in reduced output
and fewer jobs in affected industries.5
During the twentieth century, the major industrial nations have partic-
ipated in several systems intended to provide exchange-rate stability.6 Of
these, the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 and, on a regional scale, the
European Community's Exchange Rate Mechanism ("ERM") have
come closest to maintaining exchange-rate stability.7 These systems im-
plemented similar exchange arrangements that functioned effectively for
an extended period. Yet, in light of the recent turbulence the ERM has
experienced and the Bretton Woods agreement's collapse in 1971, the
1. See Joseph Gold, Exchange Rates in International Law and Organization 1
(1988) [hereinafter "Exchange Rates"].
2. See id
3. Id (quoting Group of Thirty, The Problem of Exchange Rates: A Policy State-
ment 10 (1982)).
4. See Charles Engel & Craig S. Hakkio, Exchange Rate Regimes and Volatility,
Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City Econ. Rev., Third Quarter 52, 52 (1993).
5. See John H. Works, Jr., The European Currency Unit: The Increasing Significance
of the European Monetary System's Currency Cocktail, 41 Bus. Law 483, 484 n.4 (1985).
6. For an overview of twentieth century exchange-rate regimes, see generally Brian
Tew, The Evolution of the International Monetary System 1945-77 (4th ed. 1988).
7. See Michael D. Bordo, The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A His-
torical Overview, in A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for Interna-
tional Monetary Reform 3, 3-7 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds., 1993).
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two most significant post-war attempts at cooperative exchange-rate
management appear to have foundered.
Most of the literature addressing the Bretton Woods agreement and
the ERM focuses on the systems' respective economic performances and
on issues of monetary policy.8 Rather than examining these systems in
the context of the perennial economic debate over fixed versus floating
exchange rates, this Note surveys the institutional structure and histori-
cal evolution of the two systems and analyzes their legal regimes. Part I
addresses the rise and fall of the Bretton Woods system. Part II exam-
ines the European Community's quest for exchange-rate stability, which
culminated in the ERM. Part II then considers some of the reasons for
the ERM's recent unravelling. Part III analyzes the similarities between
the two systems' legal structures and argues that in addition to suffering
from macro-economic problems endemic to the international manage-
ment of exchange rates, each system was flawed by the lack of an ade-
quate legal regime. This Note concludes that to achieve exchange-rate
stability and monetary union, the European Community (the "Commu-
nity") should forego the long transitional phase now required by the
Treaty on European Union9 and decisively adopt the European Currency
Unit (the "ECU") as the common currency for those of its Member
States with strong, stable currencies. The creation of a monetary union
for a core of Member States would reduce overall pressure on the ERM
and hasten the Community's transition to full Economic and Monetary
Union.
I. THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM
The first multilateral charter for the regulation of the international
monetary system was negotiated at the United Nations Monetary and
Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July,
1944.10 The representatives of forty-four countries attended the Bretton
Woods conference, but the agreement's principal negotiators were the
United States, represented by Harry Dexter White, and the United King-
8. See, e.g., Alan C. Stockman, International Transmission Under Bretton Woods, in
A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Re-
form 317 (Michel D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds., 1993); The European Monetary
System (Francesco Giavazzi et al. eds., 1988).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 193-210
10. See Joseph Gold, Public International Law in the International Monetary System,
38 Sw. L.J. 799, 805 (1984) (hereinafter "International Monetary System"). The Tripar-
tite Agreement of 1936, for example, preceded the Bretton Woods agreement. According
to Gold, however, the Tripartite Agreement's participants attempted to avoid giving the
agreement the appearance of a compact having legal force. In general, according to
Gold, the international agreements that preceded the Bretton Woods agreement consti-
tuted a haphazard pattern of short-lived exchange arrangements rather than comprehen-
sive efforts to establish an international monetary system. See Gold, Exchange Rates,
supra note 1, at 3.
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dom, represented by John Maynard Keynes. I The final agreement
reached at Bretton Woods was a compromise between the American
plan, which emphasized expansion of world trade through exchange-rate
stability, and the British plan, which favored increased international li-
quidity and sought to shield domestic economies from foreign
disturbances. 12
The international monetary instability of the interwar period greatly
influenced the architects of the Bretton Woods system. The destabilizing
speculation produced by floating exchange rates in the 1920s, the subse-
quent gold exchange standard's deflationary effects, and the competitive
devaluations of the 1930s convinced the Bretton Woods participants that
a new, more resilient set of monetary arrangements was essential.' 3
International adherence to pre-World War II exchange-rate systems
was largely voluntary.' 4 The Bretton Woods participants viewed this as
a major factor in the wide-scale abandonment of these systems' ex-
change-rate obligations and the resort to beggar-thy-neighbor monetary
practices by many nations that occurred after 1933.11 The signatories of
the Bretton Woods agreement sought to create a regime that was both
sufficiently binding to deter member states' nonobservance of exchange-
rate commitments and flexible enough to allow the participants to pursue
independent domestic monetary and fiscal objectives. 6 In his Proposals
for an International Clearing Union, Keynes declared: "We need an or-
derly and agreed method of determining the relative exchange values of
national currency units, so that unilateral action and competitive ex-
change depreciations are prevented."'"
The Bretton Woods conference produced the Articles of Agreement of
the International Monetary Fund (the "Articles").'" The Articles consti-
tuted a treaty providing for the Bretton Woods participants' membership
11. See Robert Solomon, The International Monetary System, 1945-1976, 9-10
(1977).
12. See Bordo, supra note 7, at 32.
13. See iL at 81. Recent scholarship casts doubt on the accuracy of the perceived
flaws of the interwar system. However, for purposes of understanding the Bretton Woods
system's objectives, the perceptions of the participants, rather than the actual flaws of the
interwar system, are important. See iL at 31.
14. See Stephen Zamora, Sir Joseph Gold and the Development of International Mone-
tary Law, 23 Int'l Law 1009, 1013-14 (1989).
15. See Bordo supra note 7, at 28, 81. Beggar-thy-neighbor policies refer to a coun-
try's efforts to better its domestic economic performance at the expense of other coun-
tries. This is accomplished through currency devaluations or tariff policies intended to
shift world demand toward domestic output. See Paul R. Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld,
International Economics 534-35 (3d ed. 1994).
16. See Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrange-
ments, 77 Am. J. Int'l L. 443, 445 (1983) [hereinafter Soft Law].
17. John Maynard Keynes, Proposals for an International Clearing Union (1943) re-
printed in 3 The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International
Monetary Cooperation 20 (J. Keith Horsefield ed., 1969).
18. Bretton Woods Agreement, December 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 60 Stat. 1401,
[hereinafter Articles of Agreement], as amended April 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S.
No. 8937 (entered into force Apr. 1, 1978).
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in the International Monetary Fund (the "Fund"). 9 The Articles' stated
purposes were to promote international monetary cooperation, facilitate
the growth of international trade and the attainment of high employment
levels, encourage exchange-rate stability, establish a multilateral system
of payments for current account transactions, create confidence in mem-
ber countries by making available the IMF's resources, and minimize
disequilibrium in its members' balances of payments.20
A. The Par- Value System's Institutional and Legal Structure
The Bretton Woods system departed markedly from the legal doctrine
that a country's right to determine its currency's exchange rate was in-
herent in national sovereignty. 2' The Bretton Woods agreement ac-
knowledged for the first time that exchange-rate policies should be
subject to examination and endorsement by the international community.
The Articles declared that orderly exchange-rate management was a
matter of international concern, and they divided legal authority over
exchange rates between the Fund and the member states.22 To this end,
the agreement established a binding system of monetary rules, including
a mechanism to enforce compliance by participants and an intergovern-
mental organization to oversee the legal regime. Professor Stephen
Zamora concludes that "the origins of international monetary law should
effectively be dated from Bretton Woods .... The creation of the IMF
was significant not just because.., it incorporated many member coun-
tries; it was also important because of the comprehensiveness of the
scheme and the limits that it placed on national sovereignty. 23
The central feature of the Bretton Woods system's regulatory scheme
was the par-value system of Article IV.24 Under Article IV, each mem-
19. See Gold, International Monetary System, supra note 10, at 805.
20. Articles of Agreement, supra note 18, at art. I.
21. See Zamora, supra note 14, at 1009-12. Some experts have suggested that cus-
tomary international law prior to Bretton Woods imposed affirmative rules and obliga-
tions on states regarding the conduct of monetary matters. Zamora, however, argues that
the weight of authority supports the conclusion that states were not hindered in the con-
duct of their monetary affairs by customary international law. See id.
22. See Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note 1 at 32.
23. Zamora, supra note 14, at 1013.
24. See Gold, International Monetary System, supra note 10, at 808. In addition to
implementing the par-value system, the Articles of Agreement obligated participants to
make their currencies convertible for current-account transactions. The Bretton Woods
agreement required participants to allow nonresidents who earned currency as a result of
current transactions to convert this currency into any other participating currency at
exchange rates within the official margins. Except for the dollar, no major currencies
were convertible at the end of World War II. Not until 1958 did the Western European
nations achieve full current-account convertibility.
The Articles of Agreement also provided for creation of resources managed by the
Fund which were available to help deficit members finance their payments imbalances.
The Fund set a number of conditions on the use of its resources including terms related to
a member's exchange system. See Gerald M. Meier, The Bretton Woods Agreement-
Twenty-five Years After, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 239-40 (1971).
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ber, in consultation with the Fund, established a par-value for its cur-
rency either in terms of gold or the U.S. dollar."s The par-value system
created ratios, or parities, between participating currencies. The system
obligated members to intervene in their spot-exchange markets to main-
tain rates within one percent above or below parity with other participat-
ing currencies. 26 Each participant also agreed not to alter its currency's
par-value through devaluation or revaluation, except to correct a "funda-
mental disequilibrium." 27 The Articles, however, failed to define this
crucial term.
The key constraint that the Articles imposed on national sovereignty
was the requirement that a member obtain the Fund's concurrence
before making a par-value adjustment to remedy a fundamental dise-
quilibrium. The Articles required a participant to consult with the Fund
and to obtain the Fund's agreement that the proposed change was no
more extensive than necessary to remedy an existing imbalance .2
Lastly, the Articles entirely prohibited members from allowing their cur-
rency to float freely.29 The Articles thus created a system of fixed but
adjustable parities, also referred to as an adjustable peg system, designed
to promote stability without imposing rigidity.3"
Because of its massive gold reserves and strong economy, the United
States eventually assumed a central role in the par-value system. The
United States did not want to police its exchange markets to ensure that
exchange rates for the dollar were within the margins prescribed by the
Articles.31 Prior to international adoption of the Articles, the United
States had maintained a passive position with regard to exchange rates.
The United States argued at Bretton Woods that inclusion in the Articles
of a requirement that the United States abandon its earlier policy of non-
intervention would be regressive. 32 The United States thus negotiated a
provision at Bretton Woods that permitted a country to agree to under-
take market purchases and sales of gold for the settlement of exchange
transactions at a price equivalent to the par-value of its currency. Under
the Articles, a member that agreed to this undertaking was not obligated
to intervene in exchange markets to maintain margins or to take any
other action on exchange rates.33
The United States was the only nation willing to undertake market
purchases and sales of gold, and as a consequence, the dollar became the
system's primary intervention currency for settling balance-of-payments
25. See Articles of Agreement, supra note 18, at art. IV, § 1.
26. See id. at art. IV, § 3.
27. See id. at art. IV, § 5.
28. See id. (Exchange rate realignments of less than 10% did not require the Fund's
approval).
29. See Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note 1, at 51.
30. See Bordo, supra note 7, at 3-5; Gold, Soft Law, supra note 14, at 445.
31. See Joseph Gold, International Monetary System, supra note 10, at 809.
32. See Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note 1, at 60.
33. See Articles of Agreement, supra note 18, at art. IV.
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transactions.34 The United States, in effect, guaranteed that it would
convert dollars into gold at $35 per ounce. The United States played an
otherwise passive role in the Bretton Woods system. The United States
did not intervene in the markets on its own behalf and, at least initially,
created confidence that it would not devalue the dollar." The American
undertaking allowed other members to refrain from engaging in gold
transactions and enabled them to hold dollars rather than gold as their
reserve asset and intervention currency. 36 The arrangement benefited
other Bretton Woods participants because they could earn income by in-
vesting their dollar holdings in U.S. securities.37
B. Performance of the Bretton Woods Par- Value System
From the mid-1950s to 1969, the Bretton Woods system's participants
exhibited generally strong economic performance that coincided with a
period of international economic growth and trade liberalization." Prior
to the 1969 French franc devaluation and deutschmark revaluation, 39 ex-
change rates remained relatively stable.40 This stability enabled partici-
pants to reduce trade barriers without evoking criticism from domestic
producers that underpriced imports were encroaching on domestic mar-
kets. In addition, because of non-inflationary American monetary pol-
icy, 4 1 other countries benefited from U.S. price stability simply by
maintaining dollar parity.4 2
There is no clear consensus as to why the Bretton Woods agreement
broke down.43 Several problems emerged in the mid-1960s, however,
that are generally accepted as having contributed to the system's col-
lapse. First, although not intended by the Bretton Woods agreement's
architects, by 1965 the dollar had assumed a preeminent position as the
34. See Gold, Exchange Rates supra note 1, at 60.
35. See Gold, Soft Law, supra note 16, at 446.
36. See Paul Hallwood & Ronald MacDonald, International Money: Theory, Evi-
dence and Institutions 156 (1986).
37. See id.
38. See Bordo, supra note 7, at 27-28. Most European countries did not restore cur-
rent account convertibility until 1958. Prior to the restoration of currency convertibility,
the European Payments Union functioned as a clearinghouse for inconvertible European
currencies. See id.
39. See id. at 78. The French franc was devalued by 11.1% on August 8, 1969 and
the duetschmark was revalued by 9.3% on September 29, 1969. See id.
40. See id. An important exception to this stability was the sterling devaluation of
14.3% on November 18, 1967, which marked the end of sterling's role as an international
reserve currency. See id. at 49-53.
41. See Alan C. Stockman, International Transmission Under Bretton Woods, in A
Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System 317, 333-335 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry
Eichengreen eds., 1993) (noting that the United States experienced 1.9% average infla-
tion from 1962-67).
42. See Samuel Brittan, Europe Will Still Need a Monetary System, Fin. Times, Aug.
2, 1993, at 12.
43. See Barry Eichengreen, Epilogue: Three Perspectives on the Bretton Woods System,
in A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System 621, 624 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry
Eichengreen eds., 1993).
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system's key reserve currency.' In large part, the dollar's ascendancy
resulted from the British pound's decline as an alternate reserve cur-
rency.45 Subsequently, internationally-held dollar accounts, which had
provided essential liquidity for the monetary system, came to exceed U.S.
monetary gold reserves." International confidence in the dollar as a con-
vertible reserve asset flagged.47 In addition, because of expansionary
monetary policy, the American inflation rate began to rise, and the dollar
ceased to fulfill its role as a source of international price stability.48
Second, narrow exchange-rate fluctuation margins proved incompati-
ble with the increased international capital mobility that resulted from
member states' relaxation of capital controls in the 1960s.: Increased
capital mobility created an environment in which currency realignments
triggered large, speculative capital flows.5 0 Even the hint of an impend-
ing parity change caused turmoil in the exchange markets.5 Monetary
authorities were loathe to make necessary parity alterations and the ad-
justable par-value system evolved into a fixed system. 2 This de facto
exchange-rate rigidity exacerbated the economic asymmetry between
those countries with a balance of payments surplus and those with a defi-
cit. In addition, asymmetry developed between the United States as the
reserve currency country and the rest of the world. 3 The combined ef-
fects of these developments rendered the Bretton Woods system dynami-
cally unstable.54
In early 1968, speculators who believed that the U.S. government
would devalue the dollar began buying gold from the London Gold
Pool.55 In the first three months of 1968, speculators drained the Gold
44. See Bordo, supra note 7, at 47-48.
45. See id at 43-44.
46. See Solomon, supra note 11, at 30-32.
47. See Bordo, supra note 7, at 55-56. By 1964, official dollar liabilities held by for-
eign nations exceeded the U.S. gold stock, and official holders of dollars began to fear that
the Federal Reserve would be unable to maintain the dollar price of gold. A run on U.S.
gold reserves thus became a destabilizing possibility. See id. at 56.
48. See Solomon, supra note 11, at 100-09.
49. See id at 32.
50. See Bordo, supra note 7, at 82-83.
51. See id
52. See id. at 84.
53. See id. at 55-56; Solomon, supra note 11, at 169-70.
54. See Bordo, supra note 7, at 82. In response to the Bretton Woods system's confi-
dence and liquidity problems, the members of the IMF amended the original Articles.
The First Amendment created the Special Drawing Right as an artificial reserve asset to
supplement gold and take pressure off the dollar by providing an additional source of
international liquidity. The First Amendment became effective in July 1969, but proved
to be an inadequate solution. See id at 66-68; Hallwood & MacDonald, supra note 36, at
158.
55. See Maurice Obstfeld, The Adjustment Mechanism, in A Retrospective on the
Bretton Woods System 201, 223 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds., 1993). In
1961, the United States and the United Kingdom organized the Gold Pool to coordinate
central bank intervention in the gold market. See id
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Pool of $3 billion in reserves. 6 In the face of this pressure, England, in
consultation with the United States, closed the Gold Pool and replaced it
with separate private and official market tiers. 7 The Gold Pool's mone-
tary authorities agreed not to sell or buy gold in the private market tier.
Private traders could continue to trade on the market, but government
officials would allow the price of gold to rise to the market level.5 8 Cen-
tral banks in the official tier, however, would continue to transact with
each other at the official $35-per-ounce price. 59 As a consequence of
these developments, "gold was demonetized at the margin."' The link
between the international supply of dollars and a fixed market price for
gold was severed. After the establishment of the two-tier arrangement,
the Bretton Woods system was on a de facto dollar standard with no
market link to gold.61
In 1971, the United States' balance-of-payments deficit triggered an
infusion of approximately thirty billion dollars into foreign reserves.62
On May 5, 1971, the German central bank, faced with rapidly rising in-
flation, suspended official exchange-market operations and allowed the
deutschmark to float.63 Speculative pressure against the dollar became
intense. Citing economic, political, and military considerations, the
United States officially withdrew from the Bretton Woods exchange rate
system on August 15, 1971.64 President Nixon announced that the
United States would no longer convert official foreign holdings into gold
and would not take steps to maintain the dollar's parity as required by
the Articles of Agreement.65 According to Joseph Gold, former General
Counsel of the International Monetary Fund:
The United States had concluded that it was locked into an intolerable
position in which it would not be able to achieve an effective devalua-
tion of the dollar .... The United States had no hope of curing the
disequilibrium in its balance of payments and restoring its lost compet-
itiveness in international trade except by the drastic action it took.66
C. The IMF Exchange-Rate System After 1971
The Bretton Woods system ceased to function, and its participants
ceased to observe the law of the original Articles when the United States
withdrew its gold undertaking and suspended the dollar's external con-
56. See Bordo, supra note 7, at 70.
57. See Solomon, supra note 11, at 119-24.
58. See Obstfeld, supra note 55, at 223.
59. See Bordo, supra note 7, at 70.
60. Id. at 70-71.
61. See id. at 74.
62. See id. at 79.
63. See Solomon, supra note 11, at 179.
64. See id. at 186.
65. See Gold, Soft Law, supra note 16, at 447.
66. Gold, International Monetary System, supra note 10, at 816.
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vertibility.6 7 Following these actions, many countries abandoned their
currency links to the dollar and exchange rates floated.6" Fixed exchange
rates were, however, temporarily reestablished under the Smithsonian
Agreement of December 18, 1971.69 The Smithsonian Agreement ex-
panded the exchange-rate fluctuation margins to 2.25 percent and deval-
ued the dollar by increasing the official price of gold to $38 per ounce.7"
The Smithsonian Agreement, although hailed by President Nixon as "the
most significant monetary agreement in the history of the world," was
short-lived.7" Unable to withstand the pressures of speculative capital
movements caused by an impending devaluation of the dollar, the Smith-
sonian Agreement collapsed in March 1973.72
In the wake of the Smithsonian Agreement's breakdown, efforts to sta-
bilize the international monetary system continued. In April 1978, the
Second Amendment to the Articles became effective and fundamentally
altered the international exchange-rate system. 73 In contrast to the Bret-
ton Woods system of the original Articles, the Second Amendment rec-
ognized the legitimacy of floating exchange rates and required signatories
to maintain "orderly exchange arrangements."74  The amendment
marked a substantial return to national sovereignty over exchange
rates.7 5 Currently, each member is free to determine its currency's ex-
change arrangements without obtaining the agreement of the Fund or
any other member country.7 6 According to the Fund, "[flor want of a
better label, the present system might therefore be characterized as a dis-
cretionary and decentralized system."77
Although the Bretton Woods exchange-rate agreement fell short of
achieving its original objectives, the Fund survived the agreement's col-
lapse. The Fund currently monitors its members' exchange-rate policies,
but the Fund's regulatory activities are now less significant than its finan-
67. See Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note I, at 62.
68. See Robert Mundell, Panel Session I1, in A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods
System 604, 607 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds., 1993).
69. See Solomon supra note 11, at 204-06. The Smithsonian Agreement, fashioned by
the ministers of the Group of Ten, was an "interim" arrangement, the terms of which
were in derogation of the members' obligations under Article IV. Participants circum-
vented this problem by agreeing that adherence to the Smithsonian Agreement would
constitute compliance with the Articles of Agreement. See Michael H. Ryan, The Treaty
of Rome and Monetary Policy in the European Community, 10 Ottawa L. Rev. 535, 545
n.41 (1978).
70. See Solomon, supra note 11, at 208-09.
71. Paul R. Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and
Policy 550 (3d ed. 1994).
72. See Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note 1, at 62.
73. See Gold, International Monetary System, supra note 10, at 818-819.
74. Articles of Agreement, supra note 18, at art. IV, § 1.
75. See Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note 1, at 8-9.
76. International Monetary Fund, The Exchange Rate System: Lessons of the past
and Options for the Future, Occasional Paper No. 30, at 3 (1984).
77. Ia at 40.
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cial functions.7" The current Articles require the Fund to "oversee the
international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation"
and to "exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of
members."79
D. The Bretton Woods System's Underlying Flaws
The original Articles created "an international organization with re-
markable and unprecedented powers."8" Nonetheless, the Bretton
Woods system was plagued by several structural weaknesses. Not only
was the system's monetary policy overly rigid because it deterred neces-
sary realignments,8 ' but the system's legal regime was inadequate. The
Articles did not establish an enforcement mechanism that could com-
mand the loyalty of the participants or convince the private sector that
the system would not be abandoned. Throughout the Bretton Woods
system's life, participants frequently chose to act in their own economic
best interests rather than cooperate in order to reach a Pareto superior
outcome.82 In 1971, this defect proved fatal when speculative capital
flows and domestic considerations drove the United States to abandon
the system. 3
Although the Articles identified exchange rates as a matter of interna-
tional concern, only a member state was authorized to propose a change
in the par-value of its currency. Exchange-rate realignments ultimately
remained a matter within a member state's exclusive domain.84 The
Fund could neither make a realignment proposal, nor compel a member
to make a proposal.85 The Fund's role was often limited to "rubber-
stamp[ing] parity realignments." 86 At the time of the 1949 sterling de-
valuation, for example, Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer informed
the Fund's Managing Director that the United Kingdom intended to de-
value sterling by approximately 30 percent. The United Kingdom sub-
mitted formal notification of the proposal to the Fund on September 17,
1949, and that same day, the Fund's Executive Board approved the
realignment.8 7
Even when a member exceeded its authority under the Articles, the
repercussions were minor. The Articles deliberately avoided labeling a
78. See Hallwood & MacDonald, supra note 36, at 171.
79. Articles of Agreement, supra note 18, art. IV, § 3(a-b).
80. Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note 1, at 37.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
82. See Kathryn Dominguez, The Role of International Organizations in the Bretton
Woods System, in A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for Interna-
tional Monetary Reform 357, 359 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds., 1993).
83. See Solomon, supra note Ill, at 182-85.
84. See Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note 1, at 48-49.
85. See Gold, Soft Law, supra note 16, at 446.
86. Francesco Giavazzi & Alberto Giovannini, Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility:
The European Monetary System 32 (1989).
87. See id.
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member's failure to comply with exchange obligations as a "breach" or
"violation."88 If a member state failed to adhere to the central exchange-
rate requirements of Article IV, that member was not deemed to be in
violation of the agreement, but at most, could be held ineligible to use the
Fund's resources.8 9 This sanction did not deter members from disregard-
ing their obligations. Furthermore, over the Fund's first twenty years,
only five countries were officially denied access to the Fund's resources.9'
Professor Zamora observes that "the Fund has always displayed an ex-
treme reticence to the application of legal sanctions when the rules are
not observed."91 Remarkably, the system's strongest mechanism to deter
a member from floating its currency was that floating would subject the
offending member to the shame that follows the breach of an interna-
tional obligation.92
Another shortcoming of the Bretton Wood's legal regime was that the
entire par-value system rested on a voluntary undertaking. The United
States' commitment to exchange dollars for gold was the "primary
norm" upon which all of the system's other binding obligations de-
pended.9" Yet, the Unites States, itself, was not bound to perform this
service. By abrogating the agreement to convert dollars for gold, the
United States did not technically breach its obligations under the Arti-
cles. The United States action did, however, expose the Bretton Woods
system's fragility. Once the United States renounced its central role, as it
was free to, the system inevitably collapsed. Furthermore, the United
States blatantly disavowed its international obligations when it declared
that it would not pursue measures to maintain the dollar within the mar-
gins required by the Articles. Despite this transgression, the Fund made
no attempt to levy sanctions against the United States9 4
II. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S EXCHANGE RATE MECHANISM
Until the early 1970s, the Bretton Woods agreement furnished the ba-
sis for the European Economic Community's currency arrangements. 9"
The Bretton Woods system's increasing instability and the European cur-
rency realignments of the late 1960s prompted the first Community steps
toward an autonomous exchange-rate mechanism. 6 For those within
88. See Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note 1, at 46.
89. See Zamora, supra note 14, at 1017 n.39.
90. See Eichengreen, supra note 43, at 641.
91. Zamora, supra note 14, at 1017.
92. See Gold, Soft Law, supra note 16, at 446.
93. See Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note 1, at 60.
94. See Zamora, supra note 14, at 1017.
95. See Giavazzi & Giovannini, supra note 86, at 8.
96. See Jacques van Ypersele & Jean-Claude Koeune, The European Monetary Sys-
tem: Origins, Operation and Outlook 32-33 (1984). But see Peter Coffey, The European
Monetary System: Past, Present and Future 6-8 (1984) (suggesting that the causal link
between the Bretton Woods collapse and Community efforts to establish an exchange rate
was minimal).
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the Community faced with the task of fashioning a replacement for the
Bretton Woods system, however, the European Economic Community
Treaty ("EEC Treaty") provided little guidance.97 When the EEC
Treaty entered into force in 1958, the six original Member States98 al-
ready were participating in the Bretton Woods par-value system and the
European Payments Union.99 The EEC Treaty's drafters perceived these
arrangements to be so solid that they devoted little attention in the EEC
Treaty to monetary policy matters.i°°
Despite the EEC Treaty's extensive and exacting obligations in many
areas,'01 it contained only limited commitments regarding monetary pol-
icy coordination. The EEC Treaty required Member States to pursue
high domestic employment levels, price stability, and equilibrium in their
national balance of payments.'0 2 In addition, the EEC Treaty called
upon each Member State "to maintain confidence in its currency. '"03
These general obligations reflected the Community's desire to avoid pro-
longed internal and external imbalances in Member States' economies.
The EEC Treaty's drafters feared that Member States would attempt to
correct external imbalances through trade restrictions and currency de-
valuations,"° which would impede Community efforts to ensure free
movement of goods and services between Member States.'0 5 Despite the
importance of stable exchange rates, however, the Community could not
easily discipline a Member State that pursued a monetary policy incon-
sistent with the EEC Treaty's objectives. The EEC Treaty provided no
97. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987) [hereinafter EEC
Treaty].
98. The six original signatories to the EEC Treaty were Belgium, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. See id. at Preamble.
99. Prior to 1958, the European Payments Union functioned as a clearinghouse for
inconvertible European currencies and performed some of the functions of a foreign ex-
change market. See Krugman & Obstfeld, supra note 15, at 538.
100. See Economic and Monetary Union: Implications for National Policy-Makers 8
(Klaus Gretschmann ed., 1993); Roger Henderson, European Finance 32 (1993); Gold,
Exchange Rates, supra note 1, at 188 n.4.
101. The EEC Treaty gave the Community the status of a sovereign governmental
entity with lawmaking competence in numerous spheres of economic activity. The EEC
Treaty created obligations and rights constituting a legal order that bound the Member
States and prevailed over both conflicting national and public international law. See
George A. Bermann et al., Cases and Materials on European Community Law 166-242
(1993).
102. See EEC Treaty supra note 97, at art. 104.
103. Id.
104. See Hans Smit & Peter E. Herzog, 3 Law of the European Economic Community:
A Commentary on the EEC Treaty (Matthew Bender) 3-679 to 81. Prolonged dise-
quilibrium in a country's balance of payment threatens the stability of that country's
currency and may produce domestic pressure for trade restrictions or competitive devalu-
ations. These pressures may be exacerbated by high domestic unemployment and infla-
tion. For an explanation of the concepts of internal and external balance, and their
influence on monetary policy, see Krugman & Obstfeld, supra note 71, at 523-54.
105. See Giavazzi & Giovannini, supra note 86, at 7; Ryan, supra note 69, at 536-37.
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legal sanctions for a Member State's noncompliance'" 6 and stipulated
only that Member States and their central banks should "co-ordinate
their economic policies."' °7
In addition to broad monetary-policy goals, the EEC Treaty included
one article that expressly addressed exchange-rate management. Article
107 obligated each Member State to "treat its policy with regard to rates
of exchange as a matter of common concern" and included the EEC
Treaty's only enforcement provision relevant to exchange-rate policy."'
If a Member State altered its exchange rate in a way that "seriously dis-
tort[ed] the conditions of competition," Article 107 empowered the
Commission"'° to authorize other Member States to take necessary, tem-
porary counter-measures." 0
By requiring Member States to treat their exchange-rate policies as a
common concern, Article 107 obligated each state to consider its ex-
change-rate policy's effects on other Member States. Article 107, how-
ever, neither denied a Member State the right to change its currency's
value unilaterally nor required a state to consult with the Community
before taking action."' In Compagnie d'Approvisionnement de Trans-
port et de Crddit S.A. and Grand Moulins de Paris S.A. v. Commission," 2
the Court of Justice' " narrowly construed Article 107 by declaring, "[i]t
is clear from Article 107 that it is for each Member State to decide upon
any alteration in the rate of exchange of its currency under the conditions
laid down by that provision.""' 4 The Advocate-General advanced the
same interpretation' in Schldter v. Hauptzollamt Ldrrach, 6 and Rewe-
Zentral AG v. Hauptzollamt Kehl,"I7 regarding Member States' rights to
float their currency. The Court of Justice concurred and held that the
obligations imposed by Article 107 were limited to treating exchange
rates as a matter of common concern." 8
106. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104, at 3-684, 3-690.
107. See EEC Treaty, supra note 97, at art. 105. To promote cooperation between
Member States, article 105(2) created the Monetary Committee, which was empowered
to review Member States' monetary and financial policies. See id.
108. See iL, art. 107(1). Articles 102a-109 of the TEU have replaced Chapter 3 of the
EEC Treaty.
109. The Commission is the Community's executive body and has primary responsibil-
ity for ensuring that the EEC Treaty's provisions and secondary legislation are observed.
See Bermann et al., supra note 101, at 57-60.
110. EEC Treaty, supra note 97, art. 107(2).
111. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104, at 3-694.12(6).
112. Joined cases 9 & 11/71, 1972 E.C.R. 391.
113. The Court of Justice of the European Communities has exclusive final jurisdiction
to interpret Community law. See Bermann et al., supra note 101, at 69-69.
114. Compagnie d'Approvisionnement, 1972 E.C.R. at 406.
115. See Opinion of Advocate-General Roemer delivered on 11 July 1973, 1973 E.C.R.
1163, 1170-71.
116. Case 9/73, 1973 E.C.R. 1135.
117. Case 10/73, 1973 E.C.RI 1175.
118. See Schtilter, 1973 E.C.R. at 1160-61; Rewe- Zentral, 1973 E.C.R. at 1194.
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A. The European Community's Transition from the Bretton Woods
System to the Exchange-Rate Mechanism
During its first decade, the Community did not need to regulate Mem-
ber States' monetary policies extensively because the international mone-
tary system functioned adequately. 119 Except for the French franc
devaluation in 1958, and the Dutch florin and the deutschmark revalua-
tions in 1961, intra-Community exchange rates were relatively stable
prior to 1969.120 Although the Community entertained the possibility of
greater monetary-policy coordination, it pursued this goal primarily
through studies and reports rather than binding measures. 2 '
The first comprehensive efforts to fill in the EEC Treaty's monetary-
policy gaps culminated with the Werner report in 1970.122 The Werner
report proposed a stage-by-stage plan to establish an Economic and
Monetary Union. 123 In order to coordinate economic policies, the report
included suggestions about Member States' fiscal policies, deficit financ-
ing, tax policies, and financial markets. 124 In the monetary sphere, the
report called for the progressive narrowing of Community exchange-rate
fluctuation margins beyond those that the IMF Articles required. 125 The
report envisioned that Community exchange rates eventually would be-
come irrevocably fixed. 126 The report also proposed the creation of a
Community organization to provide financial assistance to Member
119. The EEC Treaty created the Monetary Committee of the European Community
comprised of two representatives from each Member State, one appointed by the Member
State's central bank, the other by its Treasury. In May 1964, the Council of Ministers
adopted a system of compulsory consultation for Member States prior to exchange rate
changes. See Council Decision 64/301 of May 8, 1964 on cooperation between Member
States in the field of monetary relations reprinted in European Communities, Monetary
Committee, Compendium of Community Monetary Texts 12 (1979) [hereinafter Com-
pendium]. In addition, the Council of Ministers created the Committee of Central Bank
Governors whose purpose was to hold consultations and exchange information regarding
credit, money, and foreign exchange markets. See Council Decision 64/300 of May 8,
1964 on cooperation between the central banks of the Member States of the European
Economic Community reprinted in Compendium.
120. See Ryan, supra note 69, at 544.
121. See van Ypersele & Koeune, supra note 96, at 35-37. In 1968, the Commission
Memorandum to the Council on Coordination of Economic Policies and Monetary Coop-
eration within the Community, referred to as the Barre Plan, proposed that exchange-
rate parity changes be subject to the preliminary agreement of the Member States. The
Barre plan also suggested that the Community examine the possibility of eliminating fluc-
tuation bands between Member State currencies. Lastly, the Barre Plan recommended
that the Community establish a system of monetary support for Member States. See id.
at 37.
122. See id. at 40-41.
123. See id. at 38. The possibility of Economic and Monetary Union was first
broached at the European Summit of The Hague in December 1969, by German Chancel-
lor Willy Brandt. Economic and Monetary Union entails, among other things, that ma-
jor economic policy decisions be taken at the Community, rather than the national level,
and that the Community adopt a single currency. See id.
124. See id. at 36-39.
125. See id. at 40.
126. See id.
BRETTON WOODS TO BRUSSELS
States and facilitate coordinated monetary action.12 7 The Werner re-
port's emphasis on both economic and monetary measures reflected a
compromise between those within the Community who favored gradual
harmonization of economic policies and those who argued that rapid
harmonization in the monetary field was the best way to compel Member
States to coordinate their policies.121 In March 1971, the Council of the
European Communities adopted the Werner report's basic scheme.'2 9
The international monetary crisis that culminated with the United States'
withdrawal from the Bretton Woods system in August 1971, however,
thwarted the Community's plan for Economic and Monetary Union. 30
Because of the Bretton Woods system's breakdown and the subsequent
enactment of the Smithsonian Agreement's broad exchange-rate fluctua-
tion margins, the Community implemented an exchange-rate system to
provide increased intra-Community currency stability. Under the Smith-
sonian Agreement the exchange-rate spread between two currencies po-
tentially could reach nine percent if one of the currencies moved to its
ceiling against the dollar and the other currency moved to its floor. Be-
cause the Community could not tolerate such wide fluctuations, it
adopted the "snake agreement,"'' 31 which became operational in April
1972.132
Under the snake agreement, Member States maintained the Smithso-
nian Agreement's 4.5 percent fluctuation margin in relation to the dollar,
but agreed to reduce their currency deviations to 2.25 percent against
other snake currencies. 33 The snake agreement was technically an
agreement between the Member States' central banks and was not a bind-
ing Community act.134 Nonetheless, because the central banks entered
into the snake agreement at the Council's behest, 35 the snake agreement
is considered the Community's first coordinated effort to establish an ex-
change-rate mechanism. 36
The snake agreement's effectiveness was short-lived. The dollar's con-
127. See Manuel Guitian & Massimo Russo et al., Policy Coordination in the European
Monetary System, IMF Occasional Paper No. 61, at 6 (1988).
128. See id
129. See Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of
the Member States of March 22, 1971, on the attainment by stages of economic and
monetary union in the Community reprinted in Compendium, supra note 119, at 25.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
131. See van Ypersele & Koeune, supra note 96, at 42. This system is referred to as the
snake agreement because, when graphically depicted, the value of a Member State's cur-
rency approximated a sinoidal curve as it fluctuated above or below its pegged rate. See
Bermann et al., supra note 101, at 1195.
132. See Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of
the Member States reprinted in Compendium, supra note 119, at 30; van Ypersele &
Koeune, supra note 96, at 41.
133. See Peter Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System 2-4 (1982).
134. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104, at 3-585 to 86.
135. See van Ypersele & Koeune, supra note 96, at 41-42.
136. See Works, supra note 5, at 491; IMF Occasional Paper No. 61, supra note 127, at
7 n.14.
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tinued instability disrupted its operation, and the 1973 oil crisis, which
created severe balance-of-payments problems for the Member States,
made it difficult for them to maintain their exchange-rate parities. 137 The
Member States' lack of commitment to the snake agreement and an in-
sufficient understanding of the need to shift authority to Community in-
stitutions compounded the external economic problems that beset the
agreement. 138 In 1973, the snake agreement's participants decided to let
their currencies float against the dollar. 139 By 1976, three of the four
major participants had left the snake agreement and allowed their cur-
rencies to float. 14°
B. The European Monetary System
From 1973 to 1977, the Community's plans for monetary-policy coor-
dination remained moribund.14 ' They were revived, however, by Roy
Jenkins, President of the Commission, in a 1977 speech in which he pro-
posed European monetary integration as the best way to promote eco-
nomic growth and combat the inflation and unemployment then plaguing
Europe. 142 Responding to Jenkins' suggestion and motivated by the de-
sire to increase independence from the United States in monetary mat-
ters, German Chancellor Helmut Schimdt and French President Giscard
d'Estaing launched the idea of a European Monetary System
("EMS"). 143 After a period of intense bilateral negotiations, the Euro-
pean Council'" approved the Franco-German initiative and adopted a
137. See Krugman & Obstfeld, supra note 71, at 567-69.
138. See Henderson, supra note 99, at 34; Works, supra note 5, at 9-10.
139. See Van Ypersele & Koeune, supra note 96, at 43.
140. See id. The snake's original members were the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy. The U.K. joined briefly in 1972 and
by 1976, both France and Italy had abandoned the system. According to Tommaso
Padoa-Schioppa, "it might be said that, during the snake period, each major member
country pursued its own economic objectives without much regard for whether they were
compatible with those of its partners and, when this produced strains on the exchange
rate, the deficit countries, one by one dropped out of the system." Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa, Money, Economic Policy and Europe 60-61 (1985) quoted in Gold, Exchange
Rates, supra note 1, at 194 n.78.
141. The Community took some steps during this period, but the role of the Commu-
nity with regard to monetary policy remained consultative and few precise policies were
implemented. The Council decision of February 18, 1974, superseded an earlier declara-
tion of the Council and strengthened Article 107's concept of "common concern" by
creating a duty of consultation for Member States. The Council decision provided that
any Member State intending to change or discontinue its currency's parity or central rate
must initiate a prior consultation with the Community. See Gold, Exchange Rates, supra
note 1, at 139.
142. See Works, supra note 5, at 10.
143. See Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note 1, at 142. See generally Peter Ludlow, The
Making of the European Monetary System 63-85 (1982) (describing the political maneu-
vering by Chancellor Schmidt and President d'Estaing prior to the Bremen Summit).
144. The European Council coordinates the Community's long-term policy and is the
Community's principle forum for considering structural changes. The European Council
is comprised of the heads of state or government of the Member States and meets regu-
larly two or three times a year. See Bermann et al., supra note 101, at 55.
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resolution establishing the EMS. 41
1. Institutional Structure of the EMS
The EMS was intended to "create a zone of monetary stability in Eu-
rope," based on close monetary cooperation and coordinated exchange-
rate management between the Member States.146 The architects of the
EMS also envisioned that, within two years, the system's arrangements
and institutions would be consolidated in a European Monetary Fund
responsible for overseeing the system's loans and developing a common
monetary policy for the Community. 47 The plans for creation of the
EMF, however, did not come to fruition.
The EMS is comprised of three principal elements: the European Cur-
rency Unit ("ECU"), the Exchange Rate Mechanism ("ERM"), and a
system of credit facilities for financing Member States' exchange-market
interventions.' 48 The ECU is a composite unit of account, or basket,
comprised of specified amounts of each Member State's currency. 4 9 A
Member State's economic strength determines the weight accorded to its
currency. 150 Establishing the ECU as Europe's single currency is a goal
of the EMS;15" ' however, at present, the ECU anchors the ERM. The
ECU serves as a numeraire, or standard of value, for the ERM, a basis
for the divergence indicator, and a unit of account for Member States'
exchange-rate interventions.15 2
The primary component of the EMS is the ERM, which is comprised
of the parity grid and the divergence indicator. 5 3 To create the parity
grid, each Member State established a rate for its currency expressed as
the price of one ECU in terms of that currency. 54 This value remains
fixed and represents the currency's central rate.' 5 5 The ratio of any two
145. See Works, supra note 5, at 492.
146. Extract from the conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council of July 6-
7, 1978 reprinted in van Ypersele & Koeune, supra note 96, at 121.
147. See van Ypersele & Keoune, supra note 96, at 61.
148. See Henderson, supra note 99, at 35.
149. See Council Regulation 3180/78 of Dec. 18, 1978, changing the value of the unit
of account used by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund reprinted in Compendium,
supra note 119, at 133, (defining the ECU and specifying the amounts of currencies that
comprised it). ECU weights remain fixed but are subject to review every five years or if
the weight of any currency changes by 25%. See Resolution of the European Council on
the Establishment of the European Monetary System and related matters, Dec. 5, 1978,
§ 2.3 reprinted in Compendium, supra note 119, at 40 [hereinafter "Resolution"].
150. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104, at 3-587.
151. See Resolution, supra note 149, § 1.4.
152. See id § 2.2.
153. See Henderson, supra note 99, at 34-36; See also Jean-Jacques Rey, The European
Monetary System, 17 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 7, 19 (1980) (describing the Resolution's
goal of stabilizing exchange rates).
154. See Resolution §§ 2-3, supra note 149, at 40-41; Giavazzi & Giovannini, supra
note 86 at 33.
155. See Resolution §§ 2-3, supra note 149, at 40-41; Giavazzi & Giovannini, supra
note 86, at 33.
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ECU central rates constitutes a bilateral central rate, which also remains
fixed.156 Bilateral central rates provide reference points against which
countries and investors can measure market exchange rates, which are
the rates at which currencies are actually traded. The bilateral central
rates of all the participating currencies form the ERM parity grid.
Under the ERM's intervention rules, each participating central bank
agrees to maintain its currency's market exchange rate with other partici-
pating currencies within a fluctuation band around the bilateral central
rate.157 A margin of 2.25 percent above or below each set of bilateral
rates establishes the permitted range of fluctuation for market exchange
rates. 158 Under this system, whenever two currencies reach their bilat-
eral limits, both states must take steps to close the gap between the cur-
rencies. To this end, "[t]he central bank of the strong currency
purchases in its exchange market the weak currency, which is at the
lower intervention limit, while the central bank of the weak currency
sells in its exchange market the strong currency, which is at the upper
intervention limit. 1 59
In addition to this intervention requirement, the ERM agreement im-
plies that a Member State should intervene in certain situations although
its currency is still within the margins." The divergence indicator, the
ERM's second element, provides the basis for intra-marginal interven-
tion in exchange rates. When a Member State's currency reaches sev-
enty-five percent of the maximum allowable 2.25 percent divergence
from its ECU central rate, that currency is at its divergence threshold.' 6 '
The divergence indicator, in effect, signals that a member's currency has
deviated from the average behavior of all the EMS currencies as embod-
ied by the ECU. The Member State should then intervene in exchange
markets with a number of other currencies in order to bring its currency
into alignment with the ECU central rate. The rationale behind the di-
vergence indicator is that a currency may be strong or weak against all
others, thus exceeding its central-rate threshold of divergence without
exceeding any bilateral limits. The divergence indicator, unlike the par-
ity grid, does not require a Member State to intervene, but the ERM
agreement suggests that a Member State should take necessary ameliora-
tive measures.' 62
156. See Resolution § 3, supra note 149, at 40; Giavazzi & Giovannini, supra note 86,
at 33.
157. See Agreement of 13 March 1979: Between the Central Banks of the Member
States of the European Community Laying Down the Operating Procedures for the Euro-
pean Monetary System, Preamble reprinted in Compendium, supra note 119, at 55 [here-
inafter Central Bank Agreement].
158. See id. Member States not originally participating in the ERM are permitted to
maintain 6% margins "which must be progressively reduced as soon as economic condi-
tions permit." Id.
159. Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note 1, at 153.
160. See Resolution § 3.5, supra note 149, at 41.
161. See id. § 3.5; Works, supra note 5, at 497.
162. See Central Bank Agreement § 3.1, supra note 157, at 55 (describing calculation
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To facilitate performance of Member States' ERM intervention obliga-
tions, the EMS includes a system of settlement and credit mechan-
isms administered by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund
("EMCF"). 16 3  The ERM's primary credit source is the Very Short-
Term Financing Facility ("VSTF"), which provides funds, in the form of
ECUs, for interventions by Member States that lack adequate reserves
and whose currency has reached the marginal limit." Under the VSTF,
each participant must provide an unlimited line of credit to other partici-
pants. A borrower is entitled to any amount of currency needed to fi-
nance required intervention in exchange markets or to cope with
temporary balance-of-payments difficulties. 6 The VSTF provides loans
for up to ten weeks with an automatic three-month renewal.
66
2. Legal Structure of the EMS
Four Community instruments established the EMS and continue to
provide its operating parameters. Foremost among these instruments is
the European Council's Resolution of December 5, 1978, on the Estab-
lishment of the European Monetary System (the "Resolution"), which
delineates the functions of the ECU, the ERM, and the short-term credit
mechanism.' 67 The Resolution also limits Member States' monetary pol-
icy autonomy by classifying currency realignment decisions as multilat-
eral agreements rather than sovereign acts by individual states. 68 The
Resolution states that a Member State that desires to change its central
rates, in other words to realign its currency, must engage in negotiations
with the ERM's other participants and the Commission.' 69  Further-
more, a Member State's central-rate adjustment requires the other par-
ticipants' mutual agreement. 7 0
Although the Resolution reflects the Member States' intentions to col-
laborate in the monetary-policy field and outlines a system for attaining
stable exchange rates, the Resolution's value as a legally binding agree-
of the divergence threshold and extolling all members to consider the failure of any state
to participate).
163. See Council Regulation 3181/78 of Dec. 18, 1978, relating to the European Mon-
etary System reprinted in Compendium, supra note 119, at 53, arts. 1-2. The EMCF is
composed of members of the Committee of Presidents of the Central Banks of the Mem-
ber States and one member of the European Commission. The EMCF is empowered to
"receive monetary reserves from the monetary authorities of the Member States and to
issue ECU against such assets." Id. at art. 1. To establish initial reserves, the central
bank of each participant contributed 20% of its gold reserves and an equal amount of its
dollar holdings to the EMCF. In return, participants received ECUs to be used to settle
debts arising from intervention obligations. See id art 1-2; Works, supra note 5, at 890,
IMF Occasional Paper No. 30, supra note 76, at 5.
164. See Giavazzi & Giovannini, supra note 86, at 37-38.
165. See Henderson, supra note 99, at 37-39.
166. See id. at 37.
167. See Resolution supra note 149, at 40.
168. See Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note 1, at 142.
169. See Resolution § 3.2, supra note 149, at 41.
170. See id.
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ment is unclear.17" ' Under Community law, European Council resolu-
tions are not binding.' 72 In addition, the Resolution cites no specific
EEC Treaty provisions as the source of the Member States' obligations
under the EMS.
In apparent recognition of its non-binding character, the Resolution
itself requests that the Community institutions pass legislation and that
the Member States' central banks conclude agreements to implement the
EMS.' 73 The Resolution's declaration that the system should "be based
on adequate legislation at the Community as well as the national
level"' 74 also reflects the European Council's awareness that the Resolu-
tion was legally ambiguous. Lastly, the Community did not include the
Resolution in the Official Journal, which publishes all legally binding
Community documents.I75
In response to the Resolution's request to implement the EMS, the
Member States' central banks adopted an agreement "laying down the
operating procedures for the European Monetary system" (the "Central
Bank agreement").' 76 The Central Bank agreement is generally regarded
as the legal instrument that gives the EMS its operational effectiveness.' 77
With two notable exceptions, the Central Bank agreement reiterates the
procedures and obligations set forth in the Resolution. The Central
Bank agreement omits the requirement that Member States consult with
and obtain consent from other participants before revaluing their cur-
rency. 7 The agreement also does not require Member States to inter-
vene based on the divergence indicator.'79 Although the Central Bank
agreement reproduced much of the Resolution and referred to it several
times, the agreement was between the central banks only and not be-
tween the Member States acting within the formal Community
structure. 1
80
171. The Conseil Constitutionnel of France, for example, addressed the Resolution's
legal value and concluded that the Resolution was only a political declaration with no
legal effect. See Rey, supra note 153, at 10 n.8. Rey nonetheless argues that the Resolu-
tion is a legally binding Community agreement. See id. at 10. See also Luca Radicabi di
Brozolo, Some Legal Aspects of the European Monetary System, 63 Rivista di Diritto
Internazionale 335 (1980) (arguing that the EMS consists only of a set of contractual
relationships); Bull. EC 1985-18, at 11-12 (proposing that Article 107 of the EEC Treaty
be amended to explicitly incorporate the EMS).
172. See Pieter Ver Loren Van Themaat, Some Preliminary Observations on the Inter-
governmental Conferences: The Relations Between the Concepts of a Common Market, a
Monetary Union, an Economic Union, a Political Union and Sovereignty, 28 Common
Mkt. L. Rev. 291, 296 (1991).
173. See Resolution § 6, supra note 149, at 42-43.
174. Id. § 1.4.
175. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104, at 3-615.
176. Central Bank Agreement, supra note 157, at 55.
177. See International Economic Law Documents, II-E-1, at 2 (CCH 1989) available
in WESTLAW, I.E.L. Library.
178. See Rey, supra note 153, at 10.
179. See id.
180. See Ren6 J.H. Smits, Some Aspects of the Monetary Law of the European Commu-
nity, 2 Legal Issues of European Integration 39, 73 (1980); Smit & Herzog, supra note
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In addition to the steps taken by the European Council and the central
banks, two Community institutions acted to establish the EMS. The
Council of Ministers increased Medium-Term Financial Assistance,
changed the European Monetary Cooperation Fund's ("EMCF") unit of
account to the ECU, and authorized the EMCF to take steps to receive
monetary reserves from the Member States and to issue ECUs for ex-
change-rate intervention.' 81 Pursuant to the Council's instructions, the
Board of Governors of the EMCF issued decisions adopting the Central
Bank agreement.' 2 Although the EMCF serves the limited function of
recording transactions arising under the Community's short-term credit
facilities and the ECU reserve mechanism, and has no staff of its own,
the EMCF's decisions were significant because they constituted the
EMS's only official Community acknowledgement."8 3
3. Modification of the EMS Legal Structure
In 1987, the Community took several steps to strengthen the EMS. In
addition to numerous other modifications of the EEC Treaty, the Single
European Act added a new chapter entitled "Cooperation in Economic
and Monetary Policy."'8 4 Article 102a, the only article in the new chap-
ter, explicitly referred to the European Monetary System and called upon
Member States to increase monetary cooperation and to "respect the ex-
isting powers" in the field of monetary policy.' Although this reference
to the EMS in the EEC Treaty enhanced the status of the EMS, Article
102a did not expressly acknowledge the system's binding nature and
stopped short of formally incorporating the system's requirements into
the EEC Treaty.
The Basle-Nyborg Agreement, also of 1987, modified the EMS
through amendment of the 1979 Central Bank agreement. Community
finance ministers meeting in Nyborg, Denmark and the Committee of
Central Bank Governors meeting in Basle, Switzerland agreed to permit
increased currency movements within the ERM's fluctuation margins.' 8 6
In addition, the agreement liberalized the availability of financing for in-
104, at 3-616. But see Rey, supra note 153, at 11-12 (suggesting that the Agreement
merely provided the necessary technical implementation for the binding Resolution).
181. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104, at 3-615.
182. See Board of Governors Decision 12/79 of March 13, 1979 and Decision 13/79 of
March 13, 1979 modifying the very short-term and short-term monetary support ar-
rangements respectively reprinted in van Yperesele, supra note 96, at 135-37; Smit &
Herzog, supra note 104, at 3-616.
183. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104 at 3-615 to 16.
184. EEC Treaty, supra note 97, at art. 102a.
185. Id The Single European Act also cited Article 236 as the basis for further devel-
opment in the monetary policy field thus ensuring that the Community could take no
further steps regarding monetary union without formally amending the EEC Treaty. See
Francis B. Jacobs, The European Parliament and Economic and Monetary Union, 28
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 361, 366 (1991).
186. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104, at 3-619.
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tramarginal intervention by Member States. 18 7 Lastly, the agreement
emphasized central-bank manipulation of short-term interest-rate differ-
entials, rather than currency realignments to abate destabilizing capital
flows.' The Basle-Nyborg agreement's goal was to deter speculative
capital flows by providing more flexibility for the system and enhancing
intra-marginal corrective measures. The agreement reflected the Com-
munity's desire "to foster exchange rate cohesion within the EMS"'8 9
and was perceived as a major step forward in collective Community
responsibility. 9 '
In 1987, Community interest in Economic and Monetary Union exper-
ienced a revival.' 9' This was followed, in 1989, by the Delors Report on
Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community. 192 The
report outlined a three-stage process for the Community to achieve union
and contained the nucleus of the plan eventually adopted in the Treaty
on European Union ("TEU").193 The Intergovernmental Conference on
Economic and Monetary Union convened in December 1990, to consider
the Delors report and formally develop the plan for Economic and Mon-
etary Union.'94 The Intergovernmental Conference's work was finalized
at the Maastricht summit and signed on February 7, 1992. 1 After sur-
viving challenges to its adoption in France, Denmark, and Germany, the
TEU became effective on November 1, 1993.196
As part of the sweeping changes enacted by the TEU, Article 3a de-
clares that the Community shall adopt irrevocably fixed exchange rates
leading to a single currency. 197 In addition, Articles 102a through 109 of
187. Prior to the Basle-Nyborg agreement, intra-marginal intervention required the
consent of the central bank issuing the currency used in the intervention. The Basle-
Nyborg agreement eliminated this consent requirement and made the VSTF more acces-
sible to Member States. See Niels Thygesen, Towards Monetary Union in Europe - Re-
forms of the EMS in the Perspective of Monetary Union, 31 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 447,
460 (1993).
188. See id.
189. Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the Euro-
pean Economic Community, press communique, Sept. 18, 1987 reprinted in Horst Ung-
erer et al., The European Monetary System: Developments and Perspectives, International
Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 73, 87 (1990).
190. See Henderson, supra note 99, at 37.
191. See European Update: Economic and Monetary Integration, 1991 WL 11671 (D.
R. T.) § 1 (1991).
192. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104, 3-625 to 26.
193. See infra note 197.
194. See Bermann et al., supra note 101, at 16. A second Intergovernmental Confer-
ence on Political Union was convened simultaneously. See id.
195. See id.
196. See European Union, Financial Times (London), Nov. 1, 1993 at 15.
197. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 589 (1992).
The changes to the EEC Treaty made by the TEU are incorporated into the new Treaty
Establishing the European Community [hereinafter EC Treaty], which supersedes the
EEC Treaty. Some parts of the TEU, however, are not incorporated into the EC Treaty.
Those parts of the TEU that are not incorporated into the EC Treaty are available at I
C.M.L.R. 719 (1992).
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the EEC Treaty, which addressed economic and monetary policy, have
been replaced.'98 The TEU assigns specific dates for the beginning of
each of three stages culminating in union.' 99 The TEU acknowledges
that stage one, which emphasizes increased Community policy coordina-
tion and the elimination of restrictions on the free flow of capital, has
already begun and sets January 1994, as the beginning of stage two.2eo
Stage two's principal feature is the creation of the European Monetary
Institute ("EMI"). In the future, the EMI's role will be to strengthen
monetary cooperation between Member States by issuing non-binding
opinions and recommendations on Community monetary policy. 20' The
EMI will also prepare the framework for the European System of Central
Banks and the European Central Bank, which will both become effective
during the third stage.2"2
Stage three will begin in 1997, if the "Council, meeting in the composi-
tion of Heads of State or of government," determines that a majority of
Member States has complied with the convergence criteria for member-
ship stated in the TEU.2 °3 Included among these criteria is the require-
ment that a Member State observe the normal fluctuation margins
provided by the exchange-rate mechanism for at least two years without
devaluing its currency against any other Member State's currency. 2° In
addition, a country must comply with requirements for its inflation rate
and fiscal policies. 215 If a majority of countries has not complied by the
first deadline, stage three will automatically begin in January 1999 and
will include only those countries that meet the convergence criteria at
that time.2"6 The TEU thus provides for the possibility of a two-speed
system in which a core of Member States would form a union that others
could join later.2" 7
Full monetary union is to be established at the beginning of the third
stage.2°8 The European System of Central Banks, headed by the Euro-
pean Central Bank, will be created and will decide all Community mone-
198. See EC Treaty, Title VI: Economic and Monetary Policy, 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 636
(1992).
199. See EC Treaty, 109j, supra note 197, at 652-53.
200. See European Update, supra note 191, § 2.3.1.
201. See EC Treaty, art. 109f, supra note 197, at 648.
202. See id
203. EC Treaty, art. 109j, supra note 197, at 653.
204. See id
205. See id.; M.J. Artis, The Maastricht Road to Monetary Union, 30 J. Common Mkt.
Stud. 299, 303 (1992).
206. See EC Treaty, art. 109j, supra note 197, at 653.
207. See Artis, supra note 205, at 305.
208. See EC Treaty, Art 1091, supra note 197, at 654-55. The TEU contains a special
derogation for the United Kingdom exempting it from the obligation to participate in the
third stage of EMU. See TEU Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reprinted in George Bermann et al.,
European Community Law Selected Documents 191-93 (1993). Denmark also received a
similar derogation. See Protocol on Denmark reprinted in Bermann et al., European
Community Law Selected Documents 194 (1993).
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tary issues and manage Member States' official reserves.209 Exchange
rates will become irrevocably fixed at the start of the third stage, and the
Community will substitute the ECU for all participating member
210currencies.
C. Exchange Rate Stability under the ERM
From its inception in 1979 through March 1983, the ERM exper-
ienced seven exchange-rate realignments. 21 1 During that period, signifi-
cant disparities existed between the participants' economic policies, and
their economies' inflation rates varied correspondingly. 2 2 As a result,
frequent currency realignments were necessary to maintain the ERM's
central rates. 21 3 In 1983, a consensus emerged among the ERM partici-
pants that economic policy should focus on combatting inflation. Mem-
ber States' economic performance began to converge, and from 1983 to
1987, there were only two major realignments.21 4 During the third
phase, from 1987 to 1992, there were no realignments. 2 15
During the 1980s, Germany emerged as the ERM's anchor because of
the deutschmark's strength.21 6 The deutschmark was Europe's strongest
currency because of the Bundesbank's commitment to controlling do-
mestic price levels.2 17 Until recently, European countries tied their cur-
rencies and interest rates to the inflation-resistant deutschmark in an
effort to control their own domestic inflation. According to Pieter Ver
Loren Van Themaat, former Advocate General at the Court of Justice:
Particularly since the liberalization of financial services and capital
movements ... any increase or reduction of interest-rates by the Ger-
man Central Bank as market-leader ... is immediately (often within
minutes) followed by the many central banks of other Member States
who deem it to be of vital interest for their own monetary policy to
follow the market-leader.2 18
In part because of the ERM's smooth functioning during the 1980s,
much of the Community enjoyed a period of growth and stability.21 9
The EMS is also credited with assisting traditionally inflation-prone
Member States' economies converge toward Germany's and the Nether-
209. See European Update, supra note 191, § 2.3.3.
210. See EC Treaty, art. 1091, supra note 197, at 655.
211. See Horst Ungerer et al., The European Monetary System: Recent Developments,
International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 48, 11 (1986).
212. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104, at 3-682 to 83.
213. See id.; International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 48, supra note 211, at
11.
214. See International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 48, supra note 211, at 32-
34.
215. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, National Finan-
cial Markets, 53 Financial Market Trends 10, 15 (1992) [hereinafter OECD report].
216. See id. at 16.
217. See id.
218. Van Themaat, supra note 172, at 296.
219. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104, at 3-621.
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lands' low-inflation performance.22 ° Had it not been for the ERM's resil-
ience in the years after 1982, the Community probably would not have
had the confidence to pursue plans for Economic and Monetary
Union.221
D. Breakdown of the ERM
On September 13, 1992, the first ERM realignment in five years oc-
curred when Italy devalued the lira by 7%.' Three days later, the
ERM suffered a major crisis. The United Kingdom exhausted massive
sterling reserves21 3 and raised its base interest rate from 10% to 12%,
and then to 15% in a failed effort to support the pound's exchange rate
with the deutschmark.224 The United Kingdom and Italy then sus-
pended their membership in the ERM. 2 5 In addition, Spain devalued
the peseta by 5%, and both Spain and Ireland instituted exchange con-
trols. On November 23, Spain and Portugal further devalued their cur-
rencies by 6%.226
A period of relative tranquility followed the events of "Black Wednes-
day."'227 On August 2, 1993, however, in the wake of intense speculative
attacks on several ERM currencies, the remaining participants agreed to
expand the ERM's fluctuation margins to 15% above or below par-
value." 8 Meeting in Geneva on October 8-9, European Community eco-
nomic and finance ministers acknowledged that plans for Economic and
Monetary Union would have to proceed at a much slower pace than
planned and that the 15% fluctuation margins would remain in place
indefinitely.229
Speculative pressure against overvalued currencies was the proximate
220. See id
221. See id at 603.
222. See Neill Nugent, Editorial: The Treaty on European Union: Looking Rather Dif-
ferent Twelve Months On, 31 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 1, 4 (1993).
223. Estimates are that the UK expended the equivalent of 25% of its total foreign
exchange reserves in its failed attempt to support the pound. See Kathleen Hays, Euro-
pean Monetary Union Now Up in the Air, Investor's Business Daily, Sept. 18, 1992, at 1.
224. See Geoffrey Bell, The Collapse of EMU, International Reports, Sept. 18, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library.
225. See Nugent, supra note 222, at 4.
226. See id
227. Klaus Gretschmann et al., The European Monetary System: The Geography of
Economics Versus the Politics of Money?, in Economic and Monetary Union: Implications
for National Policy-Makers 45 (Klaus Gretschmann ed., 1993).
228. See Thygesen, supra note 187, at 447. Although the Community expanded the
ERM's official exchange-rate fluctuation bands, the duetschmark and the Dutch guilder
maintained their 2.25 percent fluctuation bands throughout the crisis and the Danish
krone and French franc returned to their narrow bands as of December, 1993. See Fi-
nancial Times, Feb. 7, 1994, at I available in DIALOG, FTF file; Lionel Barber, Den-
mark Calls for Return to Narrow ERM, Financial Times, February 15, 1994, at 2; Alice
Rawsthorn, Paris Shrugs Off Industry Gloom, Financial Times, Dec. 24, 1993, at 2.
229. See Daily Report for Executives, Oct. 13, 1993, § A at 196 (BNA) available in
LEXIS, Nexis library, 1993 DER 196 File.
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cause of the ERM's collapse.2 30 According to many experts, the underly-
ing shock that precipitated the recent volatility in the exchange markets
was the cost of German unification and the German government's un-
willingness to finance this cost through normal budgetary measures.23'
While other Member States were mired in recession, the Bundesbank
pursued an anti-inflationary policy based on high interest rates.232 In
order to maintain exchange-rate parity with the deutschmark, these
countries were forced to increase their interest rates to levels that were
unsustainably high in light of these countries' slow economic growth and
high unemployment.233
International currency speculators correctly determined that several
ERM currencies were overvalued and that Member States, principally
the United Kingdom and Italy, would be forced to accept devaluation.234
Because of their lack of confidence in these currencies and in the ERM's
ability to maintain Member State discipline, speculators shifted their
holdings from the overvalued currencies to the deutschmark, thus pre-
cipitating a crisis. The Danish rejection of the TEU in June 1992 and the
possibility that France might not ratify the TEU cast further doubt upon
the Community's ability to progress toward fixed exchange rates and
prompted investors to shift their holdings to the stable deutschmark. 235
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, "market participants were confronted with a one-sided exchange
rate risk, and felt that they had little to lose and might realise major gains
by reducing their positions in the currencies under pressure .... "236
The growth of the international currency market and the Commu-
nity's removal of restrictions on the movement of capital rendered Mem-
ber States' reserves inadequate to compensate for the flows of "hot
capital" that investors channeled into deutschmarks.237 Professor Alan
Walters, former advisor to Margaret Thatcher, explained:
Since everyone found it profitable to borrow and sell pesetas etc, the
only buyers were the central banks and they soon ran out of marks in
attempts to maintain the exchange rate. Such is the weight of foot-
loose money that sloshes around world markets that the defense was
230. See Thygesen, supra note 187, at 447-48.
231. See Samuel Britain, Europe Will Still Need a Monetary System, Financial Times,
Aug. 2, at 12 (1993); Bermann et al., supra note 101, at 1197 n.l.
232. See Andrew Scott, Developments in the European Community Economies, J.
Common Mkt. Stud., August 1993, at 87, 88.
233. See Europe's Monetary Future: From Here to EMU, Economist, Oct. 23 1993, at
25.
234. See Scott, supra note 232, at 89-90.
235. See OECD report, supra note 215, at 13.
236. Id. at 10.
237. See Europe's Monetary Future, supra note 233, at 26; Rich Miller, Policy-makers
vs. Speculators: More Battles Ahead, Reuter Community Report, Sept. 21, 1992, available
in LEXIS, News Library.
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brief, futile and expensive.23 8
The destabilizing impact of portfolio shifts moved Jacques Delors,
President of the European Commission, to suggest the possible re-imple-
mentation of capital controls. According to Delors, "Cars are free to
drive but they are subject to traffic rules. I can see no reason why at an
international level, we should not study means of limiting monetary
traffic.
2 3 9
E. Underlying Causes of the ERM's Breakdown
Asymmetry between the Member States' economies played a decisive
role in the ERM's disintegration. 2" Most informed observers, however,
take the view that the ERM's problems were also a consequence of deep-
rooted weakness in the system.24 1 One aspect of this weakness that has
received relatively little attention is the ERM's flawed legal structure,
which proved infirm in two important regards. The ERM's legal founda-
tion is ambiguous, and it created an inadequate commitment mechanism
to govern Member States' exchange-rate management. These flaws un-
dermined the ERM's credibility and led investors to challenge the Com-
munity's resolve to maintain stable rates.
1. The ERM's Ambiguous Legal Foundation
The EEC Treaty contained only limited obligations regarding ex-
change rates and did not provide an exchange-rate regime for the Mem-
ber States.2 42 In addition, the EEC Treaty did not give any Community
institution the authority to require that a Member State maintain or
change its exchange rates.243 The EEC Treaty included no system of
exchange-rate management, in part, because at the time the Member
States adopted the EEC Treaty, they were participating in the Bretton
Woods system. This lack of specific exchange-rate requirements was,
however, also a reflection of the Community's inability to enact a com-
prehensive, joint monetary policy. Jacques van Ypersele explains:
The agreement on forming a customs union among the [original mem-
bers] had been laboriously obtained .... If the supporters of tighter
integration had tried to go beyond what had been obtained, by de-
manding more specific commitments on positive integration and eco-
nomic policy coordination, they would have run the risk of destroying
even the consensus that was attained. 2"
238. Alan Walters, The Fatal Flaws of that System, Sunday Times (London), Aug. 1,
1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Library.
239. Regulating the EC's Monetary Traffic, Fin. Reg. Rep., Sept. 1993, available in
WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Library.
240. See OECD report, supra note 215, at 13.
241. See Nugent, supra note 222, at 4.
242. See supra notes 95-118 and accompanying text.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 167-183.
244. van Ypersele, supra note 196, at 34.
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A similar lack of will on the part of the Member States was evident in
the creation of the EMS. The foundation of the EMS, and the ERM in
particular, rested upon shadowy instruments of uncertain legal nature.
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa observed:
The EMS was conceived and created outside the normal Community
procedures. It is not, perhaps, a praiseworthy feature, but it is a real-
ity.... [T]he bones of the system were negotiated and prepared by a
small group of personal representatives of some, but not all the Com-
munity countries, completely outside the normal channels, and in spite
of the lack of enthusiasm of technicians and several central banks.
245
The EMS was essentially the product of bilateral political efforts be-
tween France and Germany adopted by the central banks, rather than a
reflection of firm Community commitment to exchange-rate manage-
ment. Although the Community could have amended the EEC Treaty or
cited Article 107 as the basis for its exchange-rate system in 1978, it
chose instead to implement the ERM through far less direct measures.246
It is clear, as Professor Rey points out, "that the EMS was not intended
to serve as a model of legal drafting and institutional consistency. ' 247
2. The ERM's Lack of a Commitment Mechanism
In addition to its ambiguous legal origii, the ERM failed to establish a
legal regime sufficient to persuade participants and currency investors
that the Member States would not abandon it. According to Niels
Thygesen, former member of the Delors Committee on Economic and
Monetary Union, "[ilt was obvious that the starting point in the EMS
was one in which monetary authority rested ultimately in national
hands. ' 241 If a Member State failed to pursue a policy consistent with
the ERM's goals, other Member States could not easily implement legal
sanctions. Because a Member State's obligations regarding exchange rate
modifications were not contained in formal Community agreements,
neither a Community institution, nor a Member State seeking to enforce
the ERM, could resort to the Court of Justice.249 Most significantly, par-
ticipation in the ERM was not mandatory, and those Member States that
did participate could leave the system at any time.250 Lastly, the ERM
did not provide for an institution with authority to oversee exchange-rate
policy. The ERM thus established soft rules for exchange-rate manage-
ment and an even softer system for administering those rules. According
to The Economist, "[t]he ERM was not rigid enough-because, once
pressure to devalue mounted beyond a certain point... governments did
245. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Lessons for the European Monetary System, 2 Banca
d'Italia, Economic Bulletin 67 (1986) quoted in Gold, Exchange Rates, supra note I at 19.
246. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104, at 3-591.
247. Rey, supra note 187, at 29.
248. Thygesen, supra note 187, at 467.
249. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104, at 3-694.12(8).
250. See Smits, supra note 180, at 68.
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in fact have the option of giving in." 251
III. COMMON WEAKNESSES IN THE LEGAL REGIMES OF THE
BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM AND THE ERM
The Bretton Woods system and the ERM instituted similar fixed but
adjustable exchange-rate arrangements. Furthermore, the ERM's legal
regime did not go significantly beyond the original obligations that the
Bretton Woods agreement imposed. Although the ERM established the
preservation of exchange rates as a joint obligation between the Member
States,252 neither the Bretton Woods system, nor the ERM markedly di-
minished their participants' sovereignty over monetary policy. Both sys-
tems lacked authority to enforce their participants' compliance and relied
on nonspecific requirements to establish discipline.
The chief practical deterrent to breach in the Bretton Woods system
and the ERM was the international shame that would follow a partici-
pant's abandonment of the obligation to maintain fixed exchange rates.
This safeguard neither convinced international investors of the systems'
credibility, nor stopped participants from leaving when domestic eco-
nomic conditions made it advantageous for them to do so. 253
The history of the Bretton Woods agreement and the ERM suggests
that in order to endure, an exchange-rate system must be capable of forc-
ing its participants to cooperate when their short-term economic interests
would be better served through independent action. Even when all mem-
bers of an exchange-rate system understand that cooperation will lead to
the Pareto superior outcome, they will be unlikely to forgo the benefit of
independent action unless they are convinced that the other participants
are committed to the system. Confidence in the system cannot be main-
tained unless the system, itself, includes a legal regime sufficient to deter
members from acting unilaterally. As long as participants retain the op-
tion of devaluing their currency the incentive for unilateral action re-
mains, and the system's integrity is compromised. Unless participants
are willing to make a commitment to a strong legal regime by relinquish-
ing sovereignty over domestic monetary policy, any future exchange-rate
system is destined to meet the same fate as the Bretton Woods agreement
and the ERM.
Technically, the ERM is still functioning, but a viable Community ex-
change-rate system is not a realistic possibility in the near future.'
Nonetheless, because both the Community's single market, and the
TEU's plan for Economic and Monetary Union require exchange rate
stability, the Community probably will endeavor to resurrect the ERM.
"Arguably," according to the Economist, "the EC cannot remain a sin-
251. Europe's Monetary Future, Economist, Oct. 23, 1993, at 26.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 169-72.
253. See Smit & Herzog, supra note 104 at 3-621.
254. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
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gle market if its currencies are free to fluctuate against each other."'255
Monetary union requires a long transitional period with a resilient ex-
change-rate mechanism. Member States, however, have shown little
willingness to enact an exchange-rate arrangement that undermines their
control over domestic monetary policy.
An alternative to the current ERM would be for a segment of the
Community to adopt the ECU as its single currency in the near future.
Disparities between the Member States' economies make a single cur-
rency for the entire Community unlikely. The ERM, however, could be
bifurcated with the strong-currency Member States adopting a single
currency, while maintaining the present ERM with respect to the other
Member States. 256 This would be consistent with the spirit of the TEU,
which already provides for a two-tier system to begin in 1999 in the event
that all Member States do not meet the convergence criteria. 257 A rapid
move to a common currency would eliminate the need for a narrow-band
ERM and enable the Community to avoid a drawn-out stage prior to
monetary union during which the ERM would be tested severely by mar-
kets that are now aware of the Community's lack of resolve in maintain-
ing exchange rates.
CONCLUSION
In light of the fate that befell the Bretton Woods system, it is not sur-
prising that the ERM collapsed. The history of these two systems sug-
gests that semi-fixed, exchange-rate arrangements will not endure in a
period of high capital mobility unless the arrangements include commit-
ment mechanisms sufficient to establish the system's credibility with both
the participants and the international currency markets. As Horst Ung-
erer, formerly of the Bundesbank and the IMF, observed, "Ultimately,
the underlying question is one of a willingness to surrender sovereignty
to common ... institutions and to share in a common decision-making
process."25 The Bretton Woods system and the ERM were founded on
legal regimes that did not have the full commitment of their participants.
They remained sound during ordinary times, but they could not survive
an extraordinary shock. When faced with a crisis, their voluntary nature
proved fatal.
255. See Europe's Monetary Future, supra note 232, at 26.
256. See Walter Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht: A Premature Treaty, Foreign Af-
fairs, Winter 1992/93, at 127; Europe's Monetary Future, supra note 232, at 27; Bermann
et al., supra note 101, at 1203.
257. See Bermann et al., supra note 101, at 1202.
258. Horst Ungerer, Europe-The Quest for Monetary Integration, Finance and Devel-
opment, Dec. 1990, at 17.
[Vol. 622124
